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Abstract—We consider a team of heterogeneous agents that is
collectively responsible for servicing, and subsequently reviewing,
a stream of homogeneous tasks. Each agent has an associated
mean service time and a mean review time for servicing and
reviewing the tasks, respectively. Agents receive a reward based
on their service and review admission rates. The team objective
is to collaboratively maximize the number of “serviced and
reviewed” tasks. We formulate a Common-Pool Resource (CPR)
game and design utility functions to incentivize collaboration
among heterogeneous agents in a decentralized manner. We show
the existence of a unique Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE), and
establish convergence of best response dynamics to this unique
PNE. Finally, we establish an analytic upper bound on three
measures of inefficiency of the PNE, namely the price of anarchy,
the ratio of the total review admission rate, and the ratio of
latency, along with an empirical study.
Index Terms—Best response potential, CPR game, Price of
anarchy, PNE, Team collaboration, Utility design.
I. INTRODUCTION
As we become more connected around the globe, team
collaboration becomes a necessity to produce results. Although
modern workplaces endeavor to be social and collabora-
tive affairs, most workplaces fail to solve the conundrum
of achieving efficient collaboration among diverse, dynamic,
and dispersed team-members [2]. An effective collaboration
requires each team-member to efficiently work on their tasks
while backing up other team-members by monitoring and
providing feedback. Such team backup behavior improves
team performance by mitigating the lack of certain skills in
some team-members. Often times, lack of incentives to backup
other members results in team-members operating individually
and in a poor team performance. Therefore, for effective team
performance, it is imperative to design appropriate incentives
that facilitate collaboration among the agents without affecting
their individual performance.
Depending on the hierarchical structure, organizations are
often distinguished as either mechanistic (bureaucratic), or
organic (professional) [3]. While mechanistic organizations are
characterized by a rigid hierarchy, high levels of formalization,
and centralized decision making, organic organizations are
flexible with weak or multiple hierarchies, and have low levels
of formalization [4]. The flexibility in organic organizations
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leads to decentralized decision-making, and therefore, enables
quick and easy reaction to changes in the environment. Hence,
organic organizations cope best with the unpredictable and
unstable environments that surrounds them, as compared to
mechanistic organizations which are appropriate in stable
environments and for routine tasks. For organic organizations,
which lack centralized decision-making authority, it is essen-
tial to incentivize collaboration among heterogeneous team-
members to achieve efficient team performance.
CPR games [5, 6] is a class of resource sharing games in
which players jointly manage a common pool of resource and
make strategic decisions to maximize their utilities. In this
paper, we design incentives for the heterogeneous agents to
facilitate aforementioned team backup behavior. In particular,
we connect the class of problems involving human-team-
supervised autonomy [7] with the CPR games, and design
utilities that yield the desired behavior. Within the queueing
theory paradigm that has been used to study these prob-
lems [8–10], we show that CPR games provide a formal
framework to analyze and design organic teams. Specifically,
utilizing the CPR framework allows us to incentivize team
collaboration among heterogeneous agents in a decentralized
manner, i.e., efficient social utility is achieved despite self-
interested actions of the individuals.
Game-theoretic approaches have been utilized for problems
in distributed control [11], wherein the overall system is
driven to an efficient equilibrium strategy that is close to
the social optimum through an appropriate design of utility
functions [12]. Price of Anarchy (PoA) [13] is often used
to characterize efficiency of the equilibrium strategies in
a game. Associated analysis techniques utilize smoothness
property of the utility functions [14], leverage submodularity
of the welfare function [15], or solve an auxiliary optimization
problem [16, 17]. These approaches do not immediately apply
to our setup. Instead, we follow a new line of analysis to obtain
bounds on PoA by constructing a homogeneous CPR game, for
which we show that the equilibrium strategy is also the social
optimum (PoA=1), and relating its utility to the original game.
Human-team-supervised autonomy is a class of motivating
problems for our setup. Queueing theory has emerged as a
popular paradigm to study these problems [8–10]. However,
these works predominantly consider a single human operator.
There have been limited studies on human-team-supervised
autonomy. These include simulation based studies [18], ad
hoc design [19], or non-interacting operators [20]. Here, we
focus on a game-theoretic approach to study one of the key
features of the human-team-supervised autonomy: the team
backup behavior, which refers to the extent to which team-
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2members help each other perform their roles [21].
We model team backup behavior in the following way. We
consider an unlimited supply of tasks from which each team-
member may admit tasks for servicing at a constant rate. We
assume that each serviced task is stored in a common review
pool for a second review. Each team-member can choose
to spend a fraction of their time to review tasks from the
common review pool and thereby provide a backup. In our
setup, any agent can review tasks from the common review
pool, independent of who serviced the task. Therefore, any
agent that services tasks can also participate in the review
process without impacting the quality of review process. This
is sensible in scenarios in which, for example, the review
process involves performing a quality check using machines
or verification through software. Without any incentives, mem-
bers may not choose to review the tasks as it may affect their
individual performance. We focus on design of incentives,
within the CPR game formalism, to facilitate team backup
behavior.
While we use human-team-supervised autonomy as a mo-
tivating example, our problem formulation can be applied to
broad range of problems involving tandem queues [22], where
servicing and reviewing of tasks can be considered as the
subsequent stages of the queueing-network. Tandem queues
are utilized to design efficient systems to study problems
such as resource allocation, inventory management, process
optimization, and quality control [23]. Existing game theo-
retic approaches [24, 25] to service rate control in tandem
queues assume that a single server is present at each stage
of the tandem queue and each server has its independent
resources. In contrast, in our setup, multiple heterogeneous
agents allocate their time at different stations based on their
skill-sets and maximize the system throughput. Additionally,
our mathematical techniques are applicable to many problems
involving dual-screening process. For example, in human-in-
the-loop systems which are pervasive in areas such as search-
and-rescue, semi-autonomous vehicle systems, surveillance,
etc., humans often supervise (review) the actions (service)
performed by the autonomous agents. In such settings, our
framework incentivizes collaboration among heterogeneous
agents.
Our CPR formulation has features similar to the CPR game
studied in [6, 26]. In these works, authors utilize prospect
theory to capture the risk aversion behavior of the players
investing into a fragile CPR [27] that fails if there is excessive
investment in the CPR. In the case of CPR failure, no player
receives any return from the CPR. While our design of the
common review pool is similar to the fragile CPR, our failure
model incorporates the constraint that only serviced tasks can
be reviewed. In contrast to the agent heterogeneity due to
prospect-theoretic risk preferences in [6], heterogeneity in our
model arises due to differences in the agents’ mean service
and review times.
The major contributions of this work are fivefold. First,
we present a novel formulation of team backup behavior and
design incentives, within the CPR game formalism, to facilitate
such behavior (Section II). Second, we show that there exists
a unique PNE for the proposed game (Section III). Third, we
Fig. 1: Player i devotes her time to service homogeneous tasks (at a
constant service admission rate λSi ) while reviewing serviced tasks from the
common review pool (at a constant review admission rate λRi ). The maximum
admission rate for player i for servicing and reviewing the tasks is given by
µSi and µ
R
i , respectively.
show that the proposed game is a best response potential game
as defined in [28], for which both sequential best response
dynamics [29] and simultaneous best reply dynamics [30]
converge to the PNE (Section IV). Thus, the best response of
self-interested agents in a decentralized team converge to the
PNE. Fourth, we provide the structure of the social welfare
solution (Section V) and numerically quantify (Section VI)
different measures of the inefficiency for the PNE, namely
the PoA, the ratio of the total review admission rate (TRI),
and the ratio of latency (LI), as a function of a measure of
heterogeneity. While PoA is a widely used inefficiency metric,
we define TRI and LI as other relevant measures for our setup
based on the total review admission rate and latency (inverse of
throughput), respectively. Finally, we provide an analytic upper
bound for all three measures of the inefficiency (Section V).
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we describe the problem setup and formu-
late the problem using a game-theoretic framework. We also
present some definitions that will be used in the paper.
A. Problem Description
We consider a heterogeneous team of N ∈ N agents tasked
with servicing a stream of homogeneous tasks. These agents
could be autonomous systems or human operators. Each task,
after getting serviced by a team-member, gets stored in a
common review pool for a second review. This second review
is a feedback process in which any team-member can re-
examine the serviced task from the common review pool for
performance monitoring and quality assurance purposes. Each
agent i ∈ N = {1, . . . , N} may choose to spend a portion
of her time to review the tasks from the common pool while
spending her remaining time to service the incoming tasks.
We consider heterogeneity among the operators due to the
difference in their level of expertise and skill-sets in servicing
and reviewing the tasks. This heterogeneity is captured by the
average service time (µSi )
−1 ∈ R>0 and average review time
(µRi )
−1 ∈ R>0 spent by operator i ∈ N on servicing and
reviewing a task, respectively.
Let λSi ∈ [0, µSi ] and λRi ∈ [0, µRi ] be the deterministic
service and review admission rates, i.e., the rates at which
3agent i chooses to admit tasks for servicing and reviewing,
respectively. Each agent i can choose their service and review
admission rate independent of other agents. The range of λSi
and λRi have been chosen to satisfy the stability conditions
(including marginal stability) for the service and review queues
for operator i ∈ N [31, Chapter 8].
Suppose agent i selects λSi and λ
R
i as their service and
review admission rates, then
λSi
µSi
+
λRi
µRi
≤ 1,
where λ
S
i
µSi
(respectively, λ
R
i
µRi
) is the average time the agent
spends on servicing (respectively, reviewing) the tasks within
a unit time. Thus, if the agent has selected a review admission
rate λRi , then the service admission rate satisfies
λSi ≤ µSi − hiλRi , (1)
where hi :=
µSi
µRi
is the heterogeneity measure for the player i.
We consider self-interested agents that receive a utility
based on their service and review admission rates. Hence, we
will assume that agents operate at their maximum capacity,
and equality holds in (1). Fig. 1 shows the schematic of our
problem setup. Note that only serviced tasks are available for
review, and therefore,
N∑
i=1
λRi ≤
N∑
i=1
λSi . (2)
By substituting (1) in (2), we obtain,
N∑
i=1
aiλ
R
i ≤
N∑
i=1
µSi , (3)
where ai := (1 +hi). Eq. (3) represents the system constraint
on the review admission rates chosen by agents.
We are interested in incentivizing collaboration among the
agents for the better team performance. Towards this end, we
propose a game-theoretic setup defined below.
B. A Common-Pool Resource Game Formulation
We now formulate our problem as a Common-Pool Re-
source (CPR) game. Henceforth, we would refer to each agent
as a player. A maximum service admission rate µSi and a
maximum review admission rate µRi are associated with each
player i, based on her skill-set and level of expertise. Without
loss of generality, let the players be labeled in increasing order
of their heterogeneity measures, i.e., h1 ≤ · · · ≤ hN .
Let Si := [0, µRi ] be the strategy set for each player i,
from which the player chooses her review admission rate for
reviewing the tasks from the common review pool. Since we
have assumed (1) holds with equality, once player i decides
her review admission rate λRi ∈ Si, her service admission
rate for servicing the tasks λSi is given by the right hand side
of (1). Let S =
∏
i∈N Si be the joint strategy space of all the
players, where
∏
denotes the Cartesian product. Furthermore,
we define S−i =
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i Sj as the joint strategy space of
all the players except player i.
For brevity of notation, we denote the total service admis-
sion rate and the total review admission rate by λST =
∑N
i=1 λ
S
i
and λRT =
∑N
i=1 λ
R
i , respectively. Similarly, µ
S
T =
∑N
i=1 µ
S
i
and µRT =
∑N
i=1 µ
R
i denote the aggregated sum of the maxi-
mum service admission rates and maximum review admission
rates of all the players, respectively.
Let x ∈ R, defined by
x = λST − λRT = µST −
N∑
i=1
aiλ
R
i , (4)
be the slackness parameter for system constraint (3). The
constraint (3) is violated for negative values of x, i.e., when
total review rate exceeds the total service rate. In such an
event, some players commit to review more tasks than that are
available in the common review pool. The slackness parameter
characterizes the gap between the total service admission rate
and the total review admission rate for all the players. In order
to maximize high quality team throughput, i.e., the number
of tasks that are both serviced and reviewed, we seek to
incentivize the team to operate close to x = 0.
Each player i receives a constant reward rS ∈ R>0 for
servicing each task. Hence, the service utility uSi : Si 7→ R>0
for player i servicing the tasks at the service admission rate
λSi is given by:
uSi = λ
S
i r
S . (5)
To incentivize collaboration among the agents, we design the
review utility uRi : S 7→ R>0 received for reviewing the tasks
from the common review pool using two functions: a rate of
return, rR : S 7→ R>0 for each reviewed task and a constraint
probability p : S 7→ [0, 1] of the common review pool. The
constraint probability p is a soft penalty on the violation of
system constraint (3).
We model the rate of return rR and the constraint probability
p in terms of the strategy of all the players through slackness
parameter x. Furthermore, we assume that rR is strictly
decreasing in x. Therefore, for each x ∈ [0, µST ], system
constraint (3) is satisfied, and the rate of return is maximized
at x = 0. The rate of return can be interpreted as the perks that
the employer provides to all the employees for high quality
service. For example, an employer generates higher revenue
based on the high quality throughput of her company, i.e.,
based on the number of “serviced and reviewed” tasks, which
she redistributes among her employees as perks as per their
contribution to the review process. Highest quality throughput
is achieved by the company when the team efficiently reviews
all the serviced tasks, i.e., when x = 0.
We introduce the constraint probability p as a soft penalty
of the violation of system constraint (3), and therefore, we let
p = 1 if the constraint gets violated, i.e. when x < 0. We
assume that the constraint probability p is non-increasing in
x, and approaches 1 as x approaches 0. The class of sharply
decreasing exponential functions, p(λRi , λ
R
−i) = exp(−Ax),
where x ∈ [0, µST ] and A ∈ R>0, can be a good choice to
effectively model the system constraint. If the constraint is
4violated with probability p, then uRi = 0 for each player i.
Therefore, we define the utility uRi by
uRi (λ
R
i , λ
R
−i) =
{
0, with probability p(λRi , λ
R
−i),
λRi r
R(λRi , λ
R
−i), otherwise.
(6)
Let ui(λRi , λ
R
−i) = u
S
i + u
R
i be the total utility of player
i ∈ N . Each player i tries to maximize her expected utility
u˜i : S 7→ R defined by
u˜i(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i) = E[uSi (λRi , λR−i) + uRi (λRi , λR−i)]
= λSi r
S + λRi r
R(λRi , λ
R
−i)(1− p(λRi , λR−i)),
(7)
where the expectation is computed over the constraint prob-
ability p. Since rR and p depend on the review admission
rates of all the players only through the slackness parameter
x, with a slight abuse of notation, we express rR(λRi , λ
R
−i) and
p(λRi , λ
R
−i) by r
R(x) and p(x), respectively. Substituting (1)
in (7), we get:
u˜i = µ
S
i r
S + λRi
[
rR(x)(1− p(x))− hirS
]
=: µSi r
S + λRi fi(x), (8)
where fi : S 7→ R is defined by
fi(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i) = fi(x) = r
R(x)(1− p(x))− hirS . (9)
The function fi is the incentive for player i to review the
tasks. Note that player i will choose a non-zero λRi if and
only if she has a positive incentive to review the tasks, i.e.,
fi(x) > 0. Otherwise, player i drops out without reviewing
any task (λRi = 0) and focuses solely on servicing of tasks
(λSi = µ
S
i ), thereby maximizing her expected utility given by
u˜i = µ
S
i r
S .
In the following, we will refer to the above CPR game by
Γ = (N , {Si}i∈N , {u˜i}i∈N ). In this paper, we are interested
in equilibrium strategies for the players that constitute a PNE
defined below.
Definition 1 (Pure Nash Equilibrium). A PNE is a strategy
profile λR∗ = {λRi ∗}i∈N ∈ S, such that for each player i ∈
N , u˜i(λRi ∗, λR−i∗) ≥ u˜i(λRi , λR−i∗), for any λRi ∈ Si.
Let bi : S−i 7→ Si defined by
bi(λ
R
−i) ∈ argmax
λRi ∈Si
u˜i(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i),
be a best response of player i to the review admission rates
of other players λR−i. A PNE exists if and only if there exists
an invariant strategy profile, λR∗ = {λRi ∗}i∈N ∈ S, such that
λRi
∗
= bi(λ
R
−i
∗
), for each i ∈ N .
III. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF PNE
In this section, we study the existence and uniqueness of
the PNE for the CPR game Γ under the system constraint (3).
Each player i ∈ N chooses a review admission rate from her
strategy set Si = [0, µRi ] and receives an expected utility u˜i
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2: Constraint probability of player i as λRi varies from 0 to µRi . a) For
λ
R
i = 0, pi(λ
R
i , ·) = 1, ∀λRi ∈ Si, b) for λ
R
i ∈ (0, µRi ), pi(λRi , ·)
is convex for λRi ∈ [0, λ
R
i ), with pi(λ
R
i , ·) 7→ 1 as λRi 7→ λ
R
i , and
pi(λ
R
i , ·) = 1, ∀λRi ∈ [λ
R
i , µ
R
i ], and c) for λ
R
i = µ
R
i , pi(λ
R
i , ·) is convex
in λRi and pi(λ
R
i , ·) < 1, ∀λRi ∈ Si.
given by (8). For any given λR−i ∈ S−i, we obtain an upper
bound λ
R
i : S−i 7→ Si on λRi defined by
λ
R
i =

0, if Λi < 0,
Λi, if 0 ≤ Λi ≤ µRi ,
µRi , if Λi > µ
R
i ,
where Λi :=
µST−
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i ajλ
R
j
ai
, such that for λRi ∈ [0, λ
R
i ) ⊂
Si, constraint (3) is automatically satisfied, and for λRi ∈
(λ
R
i , µ
R
i ] ⊂ Si, constraint (3) is violated. For λRi = λ
R
i ,
constraint (3) is satisfied if λ
R
i ∈ (0, µRi ], and is violated if
λ
R
i = 0.
We study the properties of game Γ under following assump-
tions. Recall that x = λST − λRT = µST −
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i .
(A1) For a given λR−i ∈ S−i, i ∈ N , we assume that the rate of
return rR(λRi , ·) for reviewing the tasks is continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave for
λRi ∈ Si, with rR(0, 0) = 0. Equivalently, x 7→ rR(x)
is continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing and
strictly concave for x ∈ [0, µST ], with rR(µST ) = 0.
(A2) For a given λR−i ∈ S−i, i ∈ N , we assume that the
constraint probability p(λRi , ·) is (i) continuous on Si;
(ii) is continuously differentiable, non-decreasing and
convex for λRi ∈ (0, λ
R
i ) ⊂ Si; and (iii) is equal to
1, for λRi ∈ (λ
R
i , µ
R
i ]. See Fig. 2 for an illustration.
Equivalently, p(x) is continuously differentiable, non-
increasing and convex for x ∈ (0, µST ], and p(x) → 1,
as x→ 0. Furthermore, p = 1, for every x < 0.
(A3) We assume fi(µRi , 0) = r
R(µRi , 0)(1 − p(µRi , 0)) −
hir
S > 0, for each i ∈ N , i.e., if no other player reviews
any task, then each player i has a positive incentive to
review tasks with maximum admission rate µRi .
Remark 1. The rate of return rR and the constraint probabil-
ity p can be easily designed to accommodate (A1-A3). Under
Assumptions (A1) and (A2), the incentive function fi(λRi , ·)
is strictly concave in λRi , which means for a fixed λ
R
−i, the
player i has diminishing marginal incentive to review tasks.
We make Assumption (A3) to provide positive incentives for
players to review tasks with their maximum review admission
rate µRi , if no other player chooses to review any task. We can
design game Γ to satisfy Assumption (A3) by ensuring that the
following conditions hold:
(i) rR(µRi , 0) > r
S , and µSi ≤ µRi , for each i ∈ N , and
5(ii) µRi  µST /ai, or equivalently
∑
j∈N , j 6=i µ
S
j  µRi , for
each i ∈ N .
If the latter condition holds, then x is large, and conse-
quently, the constraint probability p(µRi , 0) ≈ 0, for each
i ∈ N . For most practical purposes, servicing a task requires
more time than reviewing it, i.e., µSi ≤ µRi . Therefore,
condition (i) can be easily satisfied by designing rewards such
that rR(µRi , 0) > r
S , for each i ∈ N . If the total service
admission rate of all the players except player i is much
higher than the maximum review admission rate of player i,
i.e.
∑
j∈N , j 6=i µ
S
j  µRi , for each i ∈ N , then condition (ii)
holds. Notice that for a large team of agents where a single
agent does not have much impact on the overall service rate,
condition (ii) is true. We refer the reader to Section VI for an
example. 
Theorem 1 (Existence of PNE). The CPR game Γ, under
Assumptions (A1-A3), admits a PNE.
Proof. See Appendix A for the proof.
Let f ′i(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i) be the first partial derivative of fi(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i)
with respect to λRi . We now provide a corollary that charac-
terizes a PNE of CPR game Γ.
Corollary 1 (PNE). For the CPR game Γ, under Assumptions
(A1-A3), the following statements hold for a PNE λR
∗
=
[λR
∗
1 , . . . , λ
R∗
N ] with x
∗ = µST −
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R∗
i :
(i) f ′i(λ
R∗
i , λ
R∗
−i ) < 0 (or
dfi
dx (x
∗) > 0) for every player;
(ii) λR
∗
i = 0, if and only if, fi(λ
R∗
i , λ
R∗
−i ) ≤ 0 ; and
(iii) λR
∗
i is non-zero and satisfies the following implicit
equation if and only if fi(λR
∗
i , λ
R∗
−i ) = fi(x
∗) > 0 at
PNE, where
λR
∗
i = min
{
λ˜R
∗
i , µ
R
i
}
, (10)
with λ˜R
∗
i = − fi(λ
R∗
i ,λ
R∗
−i )
f ′i(λ
R∗
i ,λ
R∗
−i )
= fi(x
∗)
ai
dfi
dx (x
∗)
.
Proof. See Appendix B for the proof.
Proposition 1 (Structure of PNE). For the CPR game Γ
with players ordered in increasing order of hi, let λR
∗
=
[λR
∗
1 , λ
R∗
2 , . . . , λ
R∗
N ] be a PNE. Then, the following statements
hold:
(i) If, for any player k1, λR
∗
k1
< µRk1 , then ak1λ
R∗
k1
≥ ak2λR
∗
k2
and λR
∗
k1
≥ λR∗k2 , for each k2 > k1; and
(ii) if λR
∗
l = 0, for any l ∈ N , then λRi = 0, for each
i ∈ {j ∈ N | j ≥ l}.
Proof. See Appendix C for the proof.
It follows from Proposition 1 that the review admission rate
of a player i at a PNE is monotonically decreasing with the
ratio hi. Therefore, at a PNE, as the heterogeneity in terms of
hi among the players becomes very large, players with small
(respectively, large) hi review tasks with high (respectively,
zero) review admission rate. We will show in Lemma 2 that
the PNE shares these characteristics with the social welfare
solution, which we define in Section V. We illustrate this
further in Section VI.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness of PNE). The PNE admitted by the
CPR game Γ, under assumptions (A1-A3), is unique.
Proof. See Appendix D for the proof.
IV. CONVERGENCE TO THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We now show that the proposed CPR game Γ under As-
sumptions (A1-A3) belong to the class of Quasi Aggregative
games [32] as defined below.
Definition 2 (Quasi Aggregative game). Consider a set of
players N , where each player i ∈ N has a strategy set Si,
and a utility function ui. Let S =
∏
i∈N Si be the joint
strategy space of all the players, and S−i =
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i Sj
be the joint strategy space of all the players except player i.
A game Γ = (N , {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) is a quasi-aggregative
game with aggregator g : S 7→ R, if there exists continuous
functions Fi : R × Si 7→ R (the shift functions) and
σi : S−i 7→ X−i ⊆ R, i ∈ N (the interaction functions)
such that the utility functions ui for each player i ∈ N can
be written as:
ui(s) = u˜i(σi(s−i), si), (11)
where u˜i : X−i × Si 7→ R, and
g(s) = Fi(σi(s−i), si), for all s ∈ S and i ∈ N . (12)
An alternative, but less general way of defining a quasi-
aggregative game replaces (11) in the definition with:
ui(s) = ui(g(s), si), (13)
where ui : X × Si 7→ R, and X = {g(s) |s ∈ S} ⊆ R.
For the CPR game Γ, let σi(λR−i) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i ajλ
R
j and
g(λR) = Fi(σi(λ
R
−i), λ
R
i ) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i ajλ
R
j + aiλ
R
i be the
interaction functions and shift functions, respectively. The
expected utility u˜i, which is defined in (8), can be re-written
in the form
u˜i(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i) = u˜i(σi(λ
R
−i), λ
R
i ). (14)
Hence, the CPR game Γ is a quasi-aggregative game.
Specializing [32, Theorem 1] to the CPR game Γ, we obtain
that if the best response for all the players is non-increasing
in the interaction function σi(λR−i) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i ajλ
R
j , the
CPR game Γ is a best response pseudo-potential game [33] as
defined below.
Definition 3 (Best response (pseudo)-potential game). A
game Γ = (N , {Si}i∈N , {u˜i}i∈N ) is a best response pseudo-
potential game if there exists a continuous function φ : S 7→ R
such that for every i ∈ N ,
bi(λ
R
−i) ⊇ argmax
λRi ∈Si
φ(λRi , λ
R
−i),
where bi(λR−i) is the best response of player i to the review
admission of other players λR−i. Furthermore, if
bi(λ
R
−i) = argmax
λRi ∈Si
φ(λRi , λ
R
−i),
6then the game Γ is a best response potential game.
We now establish that the best response for each player is
non-increasing in σi.
Lemma 1 (Non-increasing best response). For the CPR game
Γ, under Assumptions (A1-A2), the best response mapping
bi(λ
R
−i) is non-increasing in σi(λ
R
−i), for each i ∈ N , where
σi(λ
R
−i) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i ajλ
R
j .
Proof. See Appendix E for the proof.
Furthermore, Remark 1 in [29] states that a best response
pseudo-potential game with a unique best response, is an
instance of best response potential game [28]. Therefore, the
CPR game Γ, with its unique (Lemma 4) and non-increasing
best response bi in σi(λR−i) (Lemma 1), is a best response
potential game. Hence, simple best response dynamics such
as sequential best response dynamics [29] and simultaneous
best response dynamics [30] converge to the unique PNE.
V. SOCIAL WELFARE AND INEFFICIENCY OF PNE
In this section, we characterize the social welfare solution
and provide analytic upper bounds on inefficiency measures
for the PNE.
A. Social Welfare
Social welfare corresponds to the optimal (centralized)
allocation by players with respect to a social welfare function.
To characterize the effect of self-interested optimization of
each agent, we compare the decentralized solution (PNE of
the CPR game) with the centralized optimal solution (social
welfare).
We choose a typical social welfare function Ψ(λR) : S 7→ R
defined by the sum of expected utility of all players, i.e.,
Ψ =
N∑
i=1
u˜i =
N∑
i=1
[µSi r
S + λRi fi(x)]
= µST r
S + λRT r
R(x)(1− p(x))− rS
N∑
i=1
hiλ
R
i
= (λRT + x)r
S + λRT r
R(x)(1− p (x)) . (15)
A social welfare solution is an optimal allocation that
maximizes the social welfare function.
Lemma 2 (Social welfare solution). For the CPR game Γ
with constraint
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i = c , for any given c ∈ R≥0, and
players ordered in increasing order of hi, the associated social
welfare solution, λR ∈ S is given by:
λR =
[
µR1 , µ
R
2 , . . . , µ
R
k−1,
1
ak
(c−
k−1∑
i=1
aiµ
R
i ), 0, . . . , 0
]
,
where k is the smallest index such that
∑k−1
i=1 aiµ
R
i ≤ c <∑k
i=1 aiµ
R
i . Furthermore, since
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i ∈ [0, µST + µRT ],
a bisection algorithm can be employed to compute optimal c
and hence, the optimal social welfare solution.
Proof. Under the constraint
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i = c (equivalently,
x = µST − c), Ψ is a strictly increasing function of λRT .
Therefore, for a fixed
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i = c, λ
R
T is maximized by
selecting k−1 players with smallest ai’s (equivalently, hi) to
operate at their highest review admission rate, where the value
of k is selected such that
∑k−1
i=1 aiµ
R
i ≤ c <
∑k
i=1 aiµ
R
i .
Finally, the k-th player in the ordered sequence is selected
to operate at a review admission rate such that the constraint∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i =
∑k
i=1 aiλ
R
i = c, is satisfied. Therefore, the
social welfare solution is of the form,
λR =
[
µR1 , µ
R
2 , . . . , µ
R
k−1,
1
ak
(c−
k−1∑
i=1
aiµ
R
i ), 0, . . . , 0
]
.
Furthermore, for the function rR(x) and p(x) satisfying
Assumptions (A1-A2), Ψ is strictly concave in x, i.e., ∂
2Ψ
∂x2 =
λRT
d2fi
dx2 < 0 (Lemma 3). With the known form of the social
welfare solution, the value of c, which corresponds to the
unique maximizer x of Ψ, can be computed efficiently by
employing a bisection algorithm [34].
B. Inefficiency of the PNE
We consider three measures of the inefficiency for the
PNE: a) Price of Anarchy (PoA), b) Ratio of total review
admission rate (ηTRI ), and c) Ratio of Latency (ηLI ), which
are described by
PoA =
(Ψ)SW
(Ψ)PNE
, ηTRI =
(λRT )SW
(λRT )PNE
, ηLI =
(
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i )PNE
(
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i )SW
,
respectively. While PoA is a widely used measure of the
inefficiency, ηTRI and ηLI capture the inefficiency of the
PNE based on the total review admission rate and the latency
(inverse of throughput), respectively. Since incentivizing team
collaboration is of interest, all three measures capture the
inefficiency of the PNE well.
We now provide an analytic upper bound for each of these
measures of inefficiency for the PNE. To this end, we assume
that mini{µSi } > µ
S
ThN
N(1+hN )
. For scenarios wherein servicing a
task requires much more time than reviewing it, i.e., µSN  µRN
(hN → 0), the assumption reduces to mini{µSi } > 0.
Theorem 3 (Analytic bounds on PNE inefficiency). For the
CPR game Γ, under assumptions (A1-A3), and mini{µSi } >
µSThN
N(1+hN )
, the inefficiency metrics for the PNE are upper
bounded by
PoA <
µSTaN
µST − x
, ηTRI <
µSTaN
(µST − x)a1
, ηLI <
µST
µST − x
,
(16)
where x is the unique maximizer of fi, i.e., dfidx (x) = 0 .
Proof. See Appendix F for the proof.
Example 1: We show analytic upper bounds on inefficiency
measures for the PNE for a specific class of exponential func-
tions rR(x) = A[1−exp{B(x−µST )}] and p(x) = exp(−Bx),
where A and B are positive constants, and x ∈ [0, µST ].
Setting dfidx (x) = 0, we obtain x =
µST
2 . Using Theorem 3,
we get PoA < 2aN , ηTRI < 2aNa1 , and ηLI < 2. For µ
S
N 
µRN , PoA < 2aN → 2, and ηTRI < 2aNa1 < 2aN → 2.
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Fig. 3: Social welfare solution (SW) and pure Nash equilibrium for a) low
and b) high heterogeneity among players, respectively. Red circles show the
maximum review admission rate (µRi ) for player i.
VI. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we present numerical examples illustrating
the uniqueness of PNE and the variation of inefficiency with
increasing heterogeneity among the players.
In our numerical illustrations, we obtain the PNE by
simulating the sequential best response dynamics of players
with randomized initialization of their strategy. We verify the
uniqueness of the PNE for different choices of functions,
rR(x) and p(x) satisfying Assumptions (A1-A2), and by
following sequential best response dynamics with multiple
random initializations for the strategy of each player. Further-
more, in our numerical simulations, we relax Assumption (A3)
and still obtain a unique PNE.
An example illustration is shown in Fig. 3, where we
show the social welfare solution (obtained using fmincon
in MATLAB) and PNE for low and high heterogeneity in
terms of variation in hi among players, respectively. For our
numerical illustrations, we choose the number of players,
N = 6, and choose the functions rR(x) and p(x), satisfying
Assumptions (A1-A2) as following:
rR(λRi , λ
R
−i) = r
R(x) = 5[1− exp{0.5(x− µST )}],
pRi (λ
R
i , λ
R
−i) = p(x) =
{
1, if x ≤ 0,
exp(−0.5x), otherwise,
where x = µST −
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i is the slackness parameter.
To characterize the heterogeneity among the players, we
sample the player’s maximum service admission rate µSi and
maximum review admission rate µRi at random from normal
distributions with fixed means, MµS ∈ R>0, and MµR ∈ R>0,
and identical standard deviation, ρ ∈ R>0. We only consider
realizations that satisfy µSi ≤ µRi for all the players, and hence,
hi ≤ 1. For most practical purposes, where servicing a task
requires much more time than reviewing it, the assumption
µSi ≤ µRi holds true. Any non-positive realizations were dis-
carded. We consider the standard deviation of the distributions
as the measure of heterogeneity among the players.
Fig. 3 shows that in the social welfare solution, players
with low ratio of hi review the tasks at maximum review
admission rate and players with high ratio of hi drop out
of the game. At PNE, the strategy profile of players follow
the characteristics described by Proposition 1. Lastly, with the
increase in heterogeneity among the players, the PNE starts to
approach the social welfare solution.
Fig. 4a-4c and Fig. 4d-4f shows the variation of different
measures of inefficiency for PNE, and their corresponding
analytic upper bounds (see Theorem 3), with increasing hetero-
geneity among the players. Fig. 4a shows the plot of PoA with
increasing heterogeneity. In case of homogeneous players,
i.e., ρ = 0, we obtain PoA = 1, which we establish in
Lemma 7. As we initially increase the heterogeneity among
the players, PNE starts to deviate from the social welfare
solution, resulting in an increase in the PoA. We note that PoA
≤ 1.15, suggesting that the unique PNE is close to the optimal
centralized social welfare solution. Fig. 4b and 4c shows ηTRI
and ηLI , which are other relevant measures of inefficiency for
our problem. It is evident from Fig. 4, that all three measures
of inefficiency are close to 1, therefore suggesting near-optimal
PNE solution.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We studied incentive design mechanisms to facilitate collab-
oration in a team of heterogeneous agents that is collectively
responsible for servicing and subsequently reviewing a stream
of homogeneous tasks. The heterogeneity among the agents
is based on their skill-sets and is characterized by their mean
service time and mean review time. To incentivize collabo-
ration in the heterogeneous team, we designed a Common-
Pool Resource (CPR) game with appropriate utilities and
showed the existence of a unique PNE. We showed that
the proposed CPR game is an instance of the best response
potential game and by playing the sequential best response
against each other, players converge to the unique PNE. We
characterized the structure of the PNE and showed that at the
PNE, the review admission rate of the players decreases with
the increasing ratio of hi =
µSi
µRi
, i.e., the review admission
rate is higher for the players that are “better” at reviewing the
tasks than servicing the tasks (characterized by their average
service and review time). Furthermore, we consider three
different inefficiency metrics for the PNE, including the Price
of Anarchy (PoA), and provide an analytic upper bound for
each metric. Additionally, we provide numerical evidence of
their proximity to unity, i.e., the unique PNE is close to the
optimal centralized social welfare solution.
There are several possible avenues of future research. It
is of interest to extend the results for a broader class of
games with less restrictive choice of utility functions, i.e.,
games that are not quasi-aggregative or commonly used games
of weak strategic substitutes (WSTS) [29] or complements
(WSTC) [29]. An interesting open problem is to consider a
team of agents processing stream of heterogeneous tasks. In
such a setting, incentivizing team collaboration based on the
task-dependent skill-set of the agents is also of interest.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1 [Existence of PNE]
We prove Theorem 1 using Brouwer’s fixed point theo-
rem [13, Appendix C] applied to the best response mapping
with the help of following lemmas (Lemmas 3-5). Recall that
bi(λ
R
−i) is the best response of player i to the review admission
rates of other players λR−i. For brevity of notation, we will rep-
resent rR(λRi , λ
R
−i), p(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i), fi(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i), u˜i(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i)
using rR, p, fi, u˜i, respectively. Furthermore, let q′ and
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Fig. 4: Empirical a) PoA, b) ηTRI , and c) ηLI , along with analytic upper bounds for d) PoA, e) ηTRI , and f) ηLI with increasing heterogeneity (ρ) among
the agents.
q′′, respectively, represent the first and the second partial
derivatives of a generic function q with respect to λRi .
Lemma 3 (Strict concavity of incentive). For the CPR
game Γ, under Assumptions (A1-A2), the incentive function
fi : S 7→ R is strictly concave in λRi , for λRi ∈ [0, λ
R
i ] and
any fixed λR−i. Equivalently, fi(x) is strictly concave in x for
x ∈ [0, µST −
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i ajλ
R
j ].
Proof. Recall from (9) that
fi(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i) = fi(x) = r
R(x)(1− p(x))− hirS .
The first and the second partial derivative of the incentive
function fi with respect to λRi in the interval λ
R
i ∈ [0, λ
R
i ]
are given by:
f ′i = (r
R)′(1− p)− rRp′ = −ai dfi
dx
, (17a)
f ′′i = (r
R)′′(1− p)− 2(rR)′p′ − rRp′′ = a2i
d2fi
dx2
. (17b)
From Assumptions (A1) and (A2), we have f ′′i < 0 and
d2fi
dx2 < 0 in the interval where derivative of fi exists, thereby
proving the strict concavity of fi in λRi and x.
Lemma 4 (Best response mapping). For the CPR game
Γ, under Assumptions (A1-A2), the best response mapping
bi(λ
R
−i) is unique for any λ
R
−i ∈ S−i and is given by:
bi(λ
R
−i) =

0, if fi(λRi , ·) ≤ 0, ∀λRi ∈ Si,
αi, if ∃αi ∈ Si s.t. ∂u˜i∂λRi (αi) = 0, and fi(αi, ·) > 0,
µRi , otherwise .
Proof. We establish uniqueness of the best response mapping
through the following three cases.
Case 1: fi(λRi , ·) ≤ 0, for every λRi ∈ Si.
If for a given λR−i ∈ S−i, fi(λRi , ·) ≤ 0, for every λRi ∈
Si, then from (8), u˜i(λRi , λ
R
−i) admits a unique maximum
at λRi = 0, and therefore, bi(λ
R
−i) = 0 is the unique best
response.
Case 2: There exists a non-empty interval Si ⊂ Si, such that
fi(λ
R
i , ·) > 0, and f ′i(λRi , ·) < 0, for every λRi ∈ Si.
For any given λR−i ∈ S−i, recall that the system con-
straint (3) is violated for every λRi ∈ (λ
R
i , µ
R
i ] ⊂ Si, and
p(λRi , λ
R
−i) = 1. Therefore, for every λ
R
i ∈ (λ
R
i , µ
R
i ], we have
fi = −hirS < 0. (18)
Therefore, bi(λR−i) ∈ [0, λ
R
i ] ⊂ Si, for any given λR−i ∈
S−i. Furthermore, for a fixed λR−i, since p is continuously
differentiable with respect to λRi , for each λ
R
i ∈ (0, λ
R
i ), u˜i
is a smooth function on the set [0, λ
R
i ]×S−i. Hence, the best
response, which is a global maximizer of u˜i on the interval
λRi ∈ Si, either occurs at the boundary of Si or satisfies the
first order condition, ∂u˜i
∂λRi
(bi) = 0 (see [35]).
Let there exist αi ∈ Si such that
fi(αi, ·) > 0, and (19a)
∂u˜i
∂λRi
(αi) = αif
′
i(αi, ·) + fi(αi, ·) = 0. (19b)
Since fi(αi, ·) > 0 and αi > 0, (19b) has a solution only if
f ′i(αi, ·) < 0. Furthermore, fi(αi, ·) > 0 implies αi ∈ [0, λ
R
i ]
(see (18)). Therefore, existence of αi satisfying (19) implies
there exists a non-empty set Si ⊂ [0, λRi ] ⊂ Si, such that
for each αi ∈ Si, fi(αi, ·) > 0 and f ′i(αi, ·) < 0. For any
9λRi ∈ Si, such that fi(λRi , ·) > 0 and f ′i(λRi , ·) < 0, using
Lemma 3, we get:
∂2u˜i
∂λRi
2 = λ
R
i f
′′
i + 2f
′
i < 0. (20)
Hence, for λRi ∈ Si, the expected utility u˜i is strictly concave
with a unique global maximizer αi ∈ Si that satisfies αi =
min{− fi(bi,·)f ′i(bi,·) , µ
R
i } (see (19b)).
Case 3: There exists a non-empty interval S˜i ⊂ Si, such that
fi(λ
R
i , ·) > 0, for every λRi ∈ S˜i, and f ′i(λRi , ·) ≥ 0, for any
λRi ∈ Si.
Finally, consider the case that f ′i(λ
R
i , ·) ≥ 0, for every
λRi ∈ Si, and there exists an interval S˜i ⊂ Si where
fi(λ
R
i , ·) > 0, for any λRi ∈ S˜i. Since f ′i(λRi , ·) ≥ 0, for every
λRi ∈ Si, i.e., fi(λRi , ·) is increasing in λRi , and therefore,
fi(λ
R
i , ·) is maximized at λRi = µRi . Since there exists a non-
empty interval S˜i such that fi(λRi , ·) > 0, for every λRi ∈ S˜i,
monotonically increasing fi(λRi , ·), it follows µRi ∈ S˜i, and
fi(µ
R
i , ·) > 0. Therefore, in the interval λRi ∈ S˜i, (19b)
has no solution and the expected utility of player i is strictly
increasing in λRi , i.e.,
∂u˜i
∂λRi
> 0, for every λRi ∈ Si. Therefore,
the best response is the unique maximum of u˜i which occurs
at the boundary µRi .
We state some important intermediate results from three
cases of Lemma 4 as a corollary for later discussions.
Corollary 2 (Best response and incentive). For the CPR game
Γ, under Assumptions (A1-A3), the following statements hold:
(i) bi = 0, if and only if, fi(λRi , ·) ≤ 0, for every λRi ∈ Si;
furthermore, fi(λRi , ·) ≤ 0, for every λRi ∈ Si implies
f ′i(λ
R
i , ·) < 0, for every λRi ∈ Si;
(ii) if there exists an interval Si ⊂ Si, such that fi(λRi , ·) >
0, and f ′i(λ
R
i , ·) < 0, ∀λRi ∈ Si, then the unique best
response for player i satisfies the implicit equation bi =
min{− fi(bi,·)f ′i(bi,·) , µ
R
i } ∈ Si; and
(iii) if f ′i(λ
R
i , ·) ≥ 0, for every λRi ∈ Si, then bi = µRi .
Proof. We only establish the first statement of the corollary.
The other statements are established in the proof of Lemma 4.
We have already established in Lemma 4 that if fi(λRi , ·) ≤ 0,
then for every λRi ∈ Si, the expected utility u˜i is maximized
for bi = 0. We now establish the “only if” part. Recall from (8)
that
u˜i(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i) = µ
S
i r
S + λRi fi(λ
R
i , λ
R
−i).
Let bi = 0 be the best response for player i for a fixed λR−i.
If there exists b ∈ Si, such that fi(b, ·) > 0, then u˜i(b, ·) >
u˜i(bi, ·), and bi = 0 cannot be a best response. Hence, bi = 0
is the best response for player i, if and only if, fi(λRi , ·) ≤ 0,
for every λRi ∈ Si.
We now show that if fi(λRi , ·) ≤ 0, for every λRi ∈ Si, then
f ′i(λ
R
i , ·) < 0, for every λRi ∈ Si. Since fi is strictly concave
in x (from Lemma 3) and fi(µRi , 0) = fi(µ
S
T − aiµRi ) > 0
by Assumption (A3), there exist γ1, γ2 ∈ R such that γ1 <
µST − aiµRi < γ2 and fi(x) > 0 if and only if x ∈ (γ1, γ2).
If fi(λRi , λ
R
−i) = fi(x) ≤ 0 for each λRi ∈ Si and for a
given λR−i, then for each λ
R
i ∈ Si, either x ≤ γ1, or x ≥ γ2.
Suppose x ≥ γ2, for each λRi ∈ Si. However, for λRi = µRi ,
x = µST − aiµi −
∑
j 6=i ajλ
R
j ≤ µST − aiµi < γ2, which is a
contradiction. Hence, x ≤ γ1, for each λRi ∈ Si.
Finally, from strict concavity of fi, fi is increasing in x for
x ≤ γ1. Equivalently, fi is decreasing in λRi , i.e., f ′i(λRi , ·) <
0, for every λRi ∈ Si.
Theorem 4 (Berge Maximum Theorem, adapted from [36]).
Let u˜i : Si×S−i 7→ R be a continuous function on Si×S−i,
and C : S−i 7→ Si be a compact valued correspondence such
that C(λR−i) 6= ∅ for all λR−i ∈ Si. Define u˜∗i : S−i 7→ R by
u˜∗i (λ
R
−i) = max{u˜i(λRi , λR−i) | λRi ∈ C(λR−i)},
and bi : S−i 7→ Si by
bi(λ
R
−i) = argmax{u˜i(λRi , λR−i) | λRi ∈ C(λR−i)}.
If C is continuous at λR−i, then u˜
∗
i is continuous and bi
is upper hemicontinuous with nonempty and compact values.
Furthermore, if u˜i is strictly quasiconcave in λRi ∈ Si for each
λR−i and C is convex-valued, then bi(λ
R
−i) is single-valued, and
thus is a continuous function.
Lemma 5 (Continuity of best response mapping). For the
CPR game Γ, under Assumptions (A1-A3), the best response
mapping bi(λR−i) is continuous for each λ
R
−i ∈ S−i.
Proof. Let z(λR−i) : S−i 7→ [
µST−
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i ajµ
R
j
ai
,
µST
ai
] be
defined by
z(λR−i) :=
µST −
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i ajλ
R
j
ai
. (21)
The mapping z(λR−i) represents an upper bound on the value
of λRi above which the system constraint (3) is violated.
Therefore, for each λRi ∈ [z(λR−i),∞) ∩ Si, from (9), we get
fi = −hirS < 0, and f ′i = −rRp′ ≤ 0, (22)
where the latter follows from monotonicity of p (Assumption
(A2)).
The mapping z(λR−i) defined in (21) is continuous on
S−i and linearly decreasing in λRj , for every j ∈ N \
{i}. Therefore, to establish the continuity of the best re-
sponse mapping bi(λR−i) on S−i, it is sufficient to show
that bi(λR−i) = φ(z(λ
R
−i)), for some continuous function
φ : [
µST−
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i ajµ
R
j
ai
,
µST
ai
] 7→ [0, µRi ]. To this end, we show
that for each fixed value of z(λR−i), bi is unique and varies
continuously with z(λR−i).
Let λˆ+ : S−i 7→ [0, µRi ] be defined by
λˆ+(λR−i) =
{
0, if fi(λRi , λ
R
−i) ≤ 0,∀λRi ∈ Si,
sup{λRi ∈ Si| fi > 0}, otherwise.
(23)
The mapping λˆ+(λR−i), when non-zero, represents the maxi-
mal admissible review admission rate for player i, that yields
her a positive incentive to review the tasks. Fig. 5 shows the
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Fig. 5: Best response of player i with varying λˆ+. The red curve shows
different possibilities for strictly concave incentive function fi(λRi ) w.r.t
λRi ∈ Si = [0, µRi ], based on the value of λR−i. In (a), fi < 0 and f ′i < 0 for
all λRi ∈ Si; in (b), there exists a subset of Si where fi > 0 and f ′i < 0; and
in c) f ′i ≥ 0 for any λR−i. At z(λRi ) (represented by blue), fi < 0 and f ′i < 0.
a) For λˆ+ = 0, bi(λR−i) = 0; b) for λˆ
+ ∈ (0, µRi ) , bi(λR−i) ∈ Si; and
c) for λˆ+ = µRi , bi(λ
R
−i) = µ
R
i .
best response of player i ∈ N for the three possible cases of
λˆ+.
Case 1: z(λR−i) ≤ 0. From (22) and statement (i) of Corol-
lary 2, bi(λR−i) = 0 is the unique (continuous) best response
for player i.
Case 2: z(λR−i) > 0. From (22), fi < 0 and f ′i < 0 for any
λRi ≥ z(λR−i). Hence, λˆ+ < z(λR−i). Now we consider three
cases based on the value of λˆ+.
Case 2.1: λˆ+ = 0. In this case, fi ≤ 0, for every λRi ∈ Si,
and therefore, from statement (i) of Corollary 2, bi = 0 is the
unique best response and continuity holds trivially.
Case 2.2: λˆ+ ∈ (0, µRi ). In this case, for any λR−i ∈ S−i,
there exists an interval Si ⊂ [0, λˆ+] such that fi > 0 and
f ′i < 0, for every λ
R
i ∈ Si. Here, f ′i < 0 follows from the
fact that the supremum in (23) corresponds to the decreasing
segment of fi. From statement (ii) of Corollary 2, there exists a
unique bi(λR−i) ∈ Si that maximizes u˜i. Application of Berge
maximum theorem [36], yields the continuity of the unique
maximizer.
Since, bi < λˆ+, it follows that if λˆ+ → 0+, then bi → 0+.
Hence, the continuity holds at λˆ+ = 0.
Case 2.3: λˆ+ = µRi . Since λˆ
+ < z(λR−i), z(λ
R
−i) ∈ (µRi , µ
S
T
ai
].
If f ′(µRi , λ
R
−i) < 0, then the continuity follows analogously to
Case 2.2. Now consider the case f ′(µRi , λ
R
−i) = −δ, for δ > 0.
Since fi is concave in λRi and its derivative is decreasing, there
exists  > 0 such that f ′ < 0 for λi ∈ (µRi − , µRi ]. Since
fi(λ
R
i , ·) is strictly concave in λRi (Lemma 3), there exists
at most one point λRi , such that f
′(λRi , ·) = 0. Therefore,
in the limit δ → 0+,  → 0+. Hence, in this limiting case
Si = (µ
R
i − , µRi ], where  → 0+, and the best response
bi(λ
R
−i) ∈ Si = (µRi − , µRi ] converges to µRi .
If f ′(µRi , λ
R
−i) ≥ 0, then it follows from strict concavity of
fi that f ′(λRi , λ
R
−i) ≥ 0, for every λRi ∈ Si. Using statement
(iii) of Corollary 2, bi(λR−i) = µ
R
i is the unique (continuous)
best response.
Note that when z(λR−i) =
µST
ai
, i.e., when no other
player reviews any task (λR−i = 0), from Assumption (A3),
fi(µ
R
i , 0) > 0 and therefore bi(λ
R
−i) = µ
R
i . Hence, bi(λ
R
−i) is
continuous for every z(λR−i), and therefore, is continuous for
λR−i ∈ S−i.
Proof of Theorem 1: To prove the existence of a PNE, define
a mapping M : S 7→ S as follows:
M(λR1 , λ
R
2 , ..., λ
R
N ) = (b1(λ
R
−1), b2(λ
R
−2), ..., bN (λ
R
−N )).
(24)
The mapping M is unique (Lemma 4) and continuous
(Lemma 5), and maps the compact convex set S (Si is
convex and compact, ∀i ∈ N ) to itself. Hence, application of
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [13, Appendix C] yields that
there exists a strategy profile λR = {λRi ∗}i∈N ∈ S which is
invariant under the best response mapping and therefore is a
PNE of the game. 
B. Proof of Corollary 1 [PNE]:
Since PNE is a best response which remains invariant under
the best-response mapping M given by (24), Corollary 1 is a
direct consequence of Corollary 2 with a simplification that
f ′i(λ
R∗
i , λ
R∗
−i ) < 0 at PNE. Therefore, to prove Corollary 1, it
is sufficient to show statement (i), i.e. f ′i(λ
R∗
i , λ
R∗
−i ) < 0 for
any player i ∈ N at PNE, which we prove by contradiction.
Let there exist a player j such that f ′j(λ
R∗
j , λ
R∗
−j ) ≥ 0 at PNE.
From (17a), it can be seen that the sign of f ′i remains the same
for all players at a PNE. Therefore, f ′j ≥ 0 implies f ′i ≥ 0
for all i ∈ N at that PNE. In such a case, (19b) implies that
the expected utility of each player with λR
∗
i > 0 (therefore,
fi > 0) is increasing in λRi at that PNE, and therefore, each of
these players can improve their expected utility by unilaterally
increasing their review admission rate. Therefore λR
∗
cannot
be a PNE, which is a contradiction. Hence, f ′i(λ
R∗
i , λ
R∗
−i ) < 0
for any player i ∈ N at a PNE, and the corollary follows. 
C. Proof of Proposition 1 [Structure of PNE]
Let λR
∗
k1
and λR
∗
k2
be the review admission rates at a PNE for
players k1 and k2, respectively, with hk1 ≤ hk2 . By proving
ak1λ
R∗
k1
≥ ak2λR
∗
k2
, λR
∗
k1
≥ λR∗k2 is established trivially since
ak1 ≤ ak2 . We assume ak1λR
∗
k1
< ak2λ
R∗
k2
and prove the first
statement by establishing a contradiction argument using two
cases discussed below. Furthermore, the proof of the second
statement is contained within Case 1 below.
Case 1: λR
∗
k1
= 0.
From statement (ii) of Corollary 1, fk1(λ
R∗
k1
, λR
∗
−k1) ≤ 0.
From (9), the incentives fk1 and fk2 for players k1 and k2 at
a PNE satisfies:
fk2 = fk1 + (hk1 − hk2)rS ≤ 0.
Therefore, utilizing statement (ii) of Corollary 1 again implies
λR
∗
k2
= 0, which is a contradiction. This case also proves the
second statement.
Case 2: λR
∗
k1
> 0.
By assumption, ak1λ
R∗
k1
< ak2λ
R∗
k2
, from statement (iii) of
Corollary 1, λR
∗
i , where i ∈ {k1, k2}, satisfy the implicit
equation
λR
∗
i = min
{
− fi(λ
R∗
i , λ
R∗
−i )
f ′i(λ
R∗
i , λ
R∗
−i )
, µRi
}
.
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We assume that λR
∗
k1
< µRk1 , and therefore, λ
R∗
k1
= − fk1f ′k1 .
Using (9) and (17a), we get
ak2λ
R∗
k2 = min
{
− ak2
fk2
f ′k2
, ak2µ
R
k2
}
≤ −ak2
fk2
f ′k2
= −ak1
fk1 + (hk1 − hk2)rS
f ′k1
≤ ak1λR
∗
k1 ,
which is a contradiction. Hence, if λR
∗
k1
< µRk1 , then ak1λ
R∗
k1
≥
ak2λ
R∗
k2
and λR
∗
k1
≥ λR∗k2 for each k2 > k1. 
D. Proof of Theorem 2 [Uniqueness of PNE]
Suppose that the CPR game Γ has multiple PNEs. We
define the support of a PNE as the total number of players
with non-zero review admission rate. Let PNE1 = λ1 =
[λ11, λ
1
2, . . . , λ
1
N ] and PNE2 = λ
2 = [λ21, λ
2
2, . . . , λ
2
N ],
be two different PNEs with distinct supports m1 and m2,
respectively. For brevity of notation, we have removed the
superscript R from the two PNEs and replaced it by their
unique identifier. Without loss of generality, let m2 > m1.
Let x1 = µST −
∑N
i=1 aiλ
1
i and x
2 = µST −
∑N
i=1 aiλ
2
i be the
slackness parameters at PNE1 and PNE2, respectively.
We prove the uniqueness of PNE using a six step process.
Step 1: We first show that if there exists two different PNEs
with distinct supports m1 and m2 (m1 < m2), then x1 < x2.
If m1 and m2 are the supports of PNE1 and PNE2,
respectively, then λ1i = 0 and λ
2
j = 0, for each i > m1, and
j > m2, respectively (Proposition 1). Additionally, λ1i > 0,
and λ2j > 0, for each i ≤ m1, and j ≤ m2. Hence, m2 > m1
implies λ1m2 = 0, while λ
2
m2 > 0.
From statement (i) of Corollary 2, bi = 0, if and only if
fi ≤ 0 and fi′ < 0 (equivalently dfidx > 0) for all λRi ∈ Si.
Therefore, λ1m2 = 0 implies f
1
m2 := fm2(λ
1) ≤ 0 and dfm2dx >
0 everywhere, while λ2m2 > 0 implies f
2
m2 := fm2(λ
2) > 0.
Since f2m2 > 0 > f
1
m2 and
dfm2
dx > 0 everywhere, it follows
that x1 < x2.
Step 2: We now show that x1 > x2 using Steps 2-5, which
is a contradiction to the result of Step 1, and consequently
m1 = m2.
From statement (iii) of Corollary 1, the review admission
rate of any player i, i ≤ m1, at PNEk, k ∈ {1, 2}, satisfies
λki = min
{
− f
k
i
fki
′ , µ
R
i
}
. (25)
Step 3: We show that f2i > f1i for any player i, i ≤ m1.
From (9), the incentives fi and fj for any two distinct
players i and j with j > i at a PNEk, k ∈ {1, 2} satisfies:
fki − fkj = (hj − hi)rS > 0, ∀j > i.
Notice that the right hand side of above equation is indepen-
dent of λRi and therefore, a constant for both PNEs. Hence,
for every i < m2
f1i − f1m2 = f2i − f2m2 .
Therefore, f2m2 > f
1
m2 implies f
2
i > f
1
i , for every i ≤ m1 <
m2.
Step 4: We show that f ′1i < f ′
2
i , for every player i, i ≤ m1.
Recall that fi is strictly concave in x (Lemma 3). Therefore,
x1 < x2 (Step 1) implies df
1
i
dx >
df2i
dx . Therefore, from (17a),
f ′1i < f
′2
i , for any player i, i ≤ m1.
Step 5: We now show that x1 > x2, which is a contradiction
to result of Step 1, and consequently m1 = m2.
Since for all players i, i ≤ m1, f2i > f1i (Step 3) and
−f ′1i > −f ′2i (Step 4), (25) implies λ2i ≥ λ1i , for each i ≤
m1. Therefore,
∑N
i=1 aiλ
2
i >
∑m1
i=1 aiλ
2
i ≥
∑m1
i=1 aiλ
1
i =∑N
i=1 aiλ
1
i , which implies x
1 > x2, which is a contradiction
to result of Step 1. Hence, m1 = m2
Step 6: We now show the value of slackness parameter x at
any PNE is unique.
Steps 1 to 5 show that, at a PNE, the number of players with
non-zero review admission rate are unique. Therefore, let m
be the identical support for PNE1 and PNE2. Without loss of
generality, let x1 > x2.
Let gi : R 7→ R, for i ≤ m, be defined by
gi(x) = − f(x)
f ′(x)
.
Differentiating gi(x) w.r.t x, we get
dgi(x)
dx
=
(dfi(x)dx )
2 − fi(x)d
2fi(x)
dx2
ai(
dfi(x)
dx )
2 .
Recall from statement (iii) of Corollary 1 that players have
non-zero review admission rate at PNE, if and only if, fi > 0
at PNE. Strict concavity of fi (Lemma 3) implies
dgi(x)
dx > 0.
Consequently, at PNE, the review admission rate for any player
i, i ≤ m, is increasing with x. Therefore, assumption x1 >
x2 implies λ1i ≥ λ2i , for each player i ≤ m. Consequently,
x1 = µST −
∑m
i=1 aiλ
1
i ≤ µST −
∑m
i=1 aiλ
2
i = x
2, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, x1 = x2.
We now show the uniqueness of PNE. Steps 1 to 6 show
that, at a PNE, the number of players with non-zero review
admission rate and the slackness parameter x are unique.
Therefore, the first order conditions (25) give the unique
review admission rate for each player i for unique slack
parameter x, thereby implying uniqueness of PNE. 
E. Proof of Lemma 1 [Non-increasing best response]
We prove this lemma by considering the three cases of the
best response mapping in Lemma 4 (Appendix A):
Case 1: bi = 0. Recall that x = µST −
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i . In this
case, from statement (i) of Corollary 2, fi ≤ 0 and f ′i < 0
(equivalently, dfidx > 0), for all λ
R
i ∈ Si. Since x can be re-
written as x = µST−aiλRi −σi(λR−i), therefore dfidx > 0 implies
∂fi
∂σi
< 0. Hence, with increase in σi(λR−i), bi = 0 remains the
best response.
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Case 2: bi = − fi(bi,σi(λ
R
−i))
f ′i(bi,σi(λ
R
−i))
. In this case, from statement (ii)
of Corollary 2, bi ∈ Si such that fi > 0 and f ′i < 0, for every
λRi ∈ Si. Thus,
dbi
dσi
=
−f ′i2 + f ′′i fi
aif ′i
2 < 0. (26)
Hence, bi is strictly decreasing in σi(λR−i).
Case 3: bi = µRi . Since bi ∈ Si = [0, µRi ], bi either decreases
or remains constant with increase in σi(λR−i). 
F. Proof of Theorem 3 [Analytic bounds on PNE Inefficiency]
We first establish the analytic upper bound on PoA, followed
by upper bounds on ηTRI and ηLI .
Let G be the family of CPR games parameterized by the
ratios of the maximum service and review admission rates of
each player i ∈ N . Therefore, the CPR game Γ ∈ G, with the
corresponding ratio for player i given by hi. Define a set of
homogeneous CPR games GH ⊂ G, in which each player has
a constant ratio {µ
S
i }H
{µRi }H
=: h, and mini{{µRi }H} ≥ {µ
S
T }H
N(1+h) .
The superscript H is used to distinguish maximum service and
review admission rates of the homogeneous game ΓH from the
CPR game Γ.
For any CPR game in G, PoA is given by:
PoA =
(Ψ)SW
(Ψ)PNE
=
[
∑N
i=1 µ
S
i r
S +
∑N
i=1 λ
R
i fi(x)]SW
[
∑N
i=1 µ
S
i r
S +
∑N
i=1 λ
R
i fi(x)]PNE
.
(27)
We now provide an analytic upper bound on the PoA for
the CPR game Γ using following Lemmas.
Lemma 6 (PNE solution for homogeneous CPR game). For
any homogeneous CPR game ΓH ∈ GH , such that for each
player i ∈ N , {µSi }H{µRi }H = h, and mini{{µ
R
i }H} ≥ {µ
S
T }H
N(1+h) ,
each player participates in the review process with equal
review admission rate λHi = λH at PNE. Let λ
H
T be the
total review admission rate at PNE for ΓH . The unique PNE
solution is given by λH =
λHT
N , where λ
H
T =
f(x)
(1+h) dfdx
and
x = {µST }H − (1 + h)λHT .
Proof. For the homogeneous CPR game ΓH , each player has
equal incentive f(x) to review the tasks. If f(x) ≤ 0 at PNE,
all players have λHi = 0 (statement (ii) of Corollary 1) which
contradicts assumption (A3). Hence, at PNE, each players has
λHi > 0.
Let mini{{µRi }H} ≥ {µ
S
T }H
N(1+h) for Γ
H . At PNE, x > 0. Let
D ⊆ N be a non-empty set of player indices such that for any
i ∈ D, {µRi }H ≤ − f(x)f ′(x) . At PNE,
λHT =
∑
i∈D
{µRi }H +
∑
i∈N\D
−f(x)
f ′(x)
≥ N min
i
{{µRi }H}
≥ {µ
S
T }H
(1 + h)
.
Therefore, at PNE,
x = {µST }H − (1 + h)λHT
≤ {µST }H − (1 + h)N min
i
{{µRi }H} ≤ 0,
which is a contradiction. Hence, D is an empty set and each
player has equal review admission rate at PNE, given by λHi =
λH =
λHT
N . Hence, each player being a maximizer of their
expected utility maximizes:
u˜i = {µSi }HrS +
λHT
N
f(x), (28)
where x = {µST }H − (1 + h)λHT . Setting ∂u˜i∂λHT = 0, we get
λHT =
f(x)
(1+h) dfdx
.
Lemma 7 (PoA=1 for homogeneous CPR game). For any
homogeneous CPR game ΓH ∈ GH , such that for each player
i ∈ N , {µSi }H{µRi }H = h, and mini{{µ
R
i }H} ≥ {µ
S
T }H
N(1+h) , PoA=1.
Proof. For homogeneous CPR game ΓH , social welfare func-
tion ΨH in (15) only depends on λRT and is given by:
ΨH = {µST }HrS + λRT f(x), (29)
where x = {µST }H − (1 + h)λRT , and f(x) is the uniform
incentive function for each player. Note that dΨ
H
dλRT
> 0 when
df
dx ≤ 0, and d
2ΨH
dλRT
2 > 0 in the interval where dfdx > 0. It
is easy to show that ΨH is maximized by any λRT satisfying
λRT =
f(x)
(1+h) dfdx
obtained by setting dΨ
H
dλRT
= 0, and dfdx > 0 at
the maximizer.
Let λHT be the total review admission rate at PNE for Γ
H .
The unique PNE satisfies λHT =
f(x)
(1+h) dfdx
(Lemma 6), and
hence, maximizes social welfare utility resulting in PoA= 1.
Corresponding to the CPR game Γ, construct a homoge-
neous game ΓHN ∈ GH with {µSi }H = µSi and {µRi }H = µ
S
i
hN
,
for each player i ∈ N . Note that for homogeneous players
in ΓHN ,
{µSi }H
{µRi }H
= h = hN , and
∑N
i=1{µSi }H = µST .
Furthermore, the assumption mini{µSi } > µ
S
ThN
N(1+hN )
im-
plies mini{{µRi }H} > {µ
S
T }H
N(1+h) . Hence, PoA = 1 for Γ
H
N
(Lemma 7).
To obtain analytic bounds on PoA, we now compute a lower
bound on the social utility obtained at the unique PNE ΨΓPNE
for the CPR game Γ. In Lemma 8, we show that the social
utility obtained at the PNE ΨHPNE for the homogeneous game
ΓHN lower bounds Ψ
Γ
PNE . For any x ∈ [0, µST ], homogeneous
players with ratio hN in ΓHN have a lower cumulative incentive
(
∑
f ) to review tasks than players in Γ, and therefore, have a
lower social utility at PNE, i.e., ΨΓPNE ≥ ΨHPNE . We further
lower bound ΨΓPNE by computing a lower bound on Ψ
H
PNE .
Lemma 8 (Lower bound for social welfare at PNE). Let
ΓHN be a homogeneous game corresponding to CPR game Γ
with each player i ∈ N having {µSi }H = µSi and {µRi }H =
µSi
hN
. Let ΨΓPNE and Ψ
H
PNE be the social welfare functions
for Γ and ΓHN , respectively, evaluated at their unique PNEs.
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Then ΨΓPNE ≥ ΨHPNE ≥ µST rS + µ
S
T−x
aN
fN (x), where x is the
unique maximizer of fi, i.e. dfidx (x) = 0.
Proof. Let λ∗ = [λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
N ] and λ
H = [λH , . . . , λH ] be the
unique PNEs for the CPR games Γ and ΓHN , respectively. Let
x∗ = µST −
∑N
i=1 aiλ
∗
i and x
H = µST − NaNλH be their
slackness parameters at respective PNEs.
Step 1: We show that xH ≥ x∗ using contradiction.
Let x∗ > xH . Recall that at PNE, dfidx > 0 (Corollary 1).
Using strict concavity of fi (Lemma 3), we have dfidx (x
H) >
dfi
dx (x
∗) > 0. Therefore, fN (x
∗)
dfN
dx (x
∗)
> fN (x
H)
dfN
dx (x
H)
= aNλ
H
N . Recall
that f1(x) ≥ · · · ≥ fN (x) for any x, and dfidx is independent
of i. Hence, fi(x
∗)
dfi
dx (x
∗)
> aNλ
H
N for any i. Using hN ≥ hi,
we get aiµRi = µ
S
i +
µSi
hi
≥ µSi + µ
S
i
hN
= aN{µRi }H >
aNλ
H
N . Therefore, aiλ
∗
i = min
{
fi(x
∗)
dfi
dx (x
∗)
, aiµ
R
i
}
> aNλ
H
N ,
for any i. Hence, x∗ < xH , which is a contradiction.
Therefore, xH ≥ x∗ (equivalently, ∑Ni=1 aiλ∗i ≥ NaNλHN )
and dfidx (x
∗) ≥ dfidx (xH) > 0.
Step 2: We show that
∑
i fi(x
∗) ≥ NfN (xH) &
∑
i λ
∗
i ≥
NλHN .
Let d ≤ N be the support for λ∗. Therefore, λ∗i =
min
{
fi(x
∗)
ai
dfi
dx (x
∗)
, µRi
}
for every i ≤ d, , and λ∗i = 0 for any
i > d. Therefore,
∑d
i=1
fi(x
∗)
dfi
dx (x
∗)
≥ ∑di=1 aiλ∗i ≥ NaNλHN =
N fN (x
H)
dfN
dx (x
H)
. Using dfidx (x
∗) ≥ dfNdx (xH) > 0 ( dfidx is indepen-
dent of i), we get
∑d
i=1 fi(x
∗) ≥ NfN (xH). Additionally,∑N
i=1 aiλ
∗
i ≥ NaNλHN implies
∑d
i=1 λ
∗
i ≥
∑N
i=1
ai
aN
λ∗i ≥
NλHN .
Step 3: We show that ΨΓPNE ≥ ΨHPNE .
Using hN ≥ hi, we have µRi = µ
S
i
hi
≥ µSihN = {µRi }H > λHN .
Let d1 ≤ d be the largest index of player satisfying fi(x
∗)
ai
dfi
dx
>
λHN . Since
fN (x
∗)
aN
dfN
dx (x
∗)
< λHN , d1 < N . Therefore, λ
∗
i satisfies,
λ∗i =
min
{
fi(x
∗)
ai
dfi
dx (x
∗)
, µRi
}
> λHN , for i ≤ d1,
fi(x
∗)
ai
dfi
dx (x
∗)
≤ λHN , for d1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
(30)
Hence,
ΨΓPNE = µ
S
T r
S +
d∑
i=1
λ∗i fi(x
∗)
(1∗)
= µST r
S + λHN
d∑
i=1
fi(x
∗) +
d1∑
i=1
(λ∗i − λHN )fi(x∗)
+
d∑
i=d1+1
(λ∗i − λHN )fi(x∗)
(2∗)
≥ µST rS + λHNNfN (xH) +
d1∑
i=1
(λ∗i − λHN )fd1+1(x∗)
+
d∑
i=d1+1
(λ∗i − λHN )fd1+1(x∗)
= µST r
S + λHNNfN (x
H) + fd1+1(x
∗)
d∑
i=1
(λ∗i − λHN )
(3∗)
≥ µST rS + λHNNfN (xH) = ΨHPNE ,
where (1∗) follows by adding and subtracting
λHN
∑d
i=1 fi(x
∗). (2∗) follows from
∑d
i=1 fi(x
∗) ≥
NfN (x
H) (Step 2), (30), and the fact that
f1(x
∗) ≥ · · · ≥ fN (x∗). (3∗) follows by recalling that∑d
i=1 λ
∗
i ≥ NλHN (Step 2).
Step 4: We show that ΨΓPNE ≥ ΨHPNE ≥ µST rS +
µST−x
aN
fN (x).
Let x be the unique maximizer of fi. From Lemma 7,
ΨHPNE = Ψ
H
SW = max{ΨH} ≥ µST rS + λRT fN (µST − aNλRT )
for any λRT . Choosing λ
R
T =
µST−x
aN
, we obtain the desired
bounds.
Proof of Theorem 3: The global optimum of social welfare
function is upper bounded by:
ΨΓSW = µ
S
T r
S + max
λRi
{
N∑
i=1
λRi fi(x)
}
≤ µST rS + max
λRi
{
λRT
}
max
x
{fi(x)}
(1∗)
≤ µST rS + µST fi(x)
≤ µST (rS + rR(x)(1− p(x))), (31)
where (1∗) is obtained using the system constraint x > 0
which implies µST ≥
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i ≥ λRT .
From Lemma 8, ΨΓPNE is lower bounded by:
ΨΓPNE ≥ µST rS +
µST − x
aN
fN (x)
=
1
aN
(
xaNr
S + (µST − x)(rS + rR(x)(1− p(x)))
)
≥ 1
aN
(µST − x)(rS + rR(x)(1− p(x))). (32)
Using (31) and (32), we get, PoA = Ψ
Γ
SW
ΨΓPNE
≤ µST aN
µST−x
.
Now we establish the bounds on ηTRI and ηLI . Let xPNE
and xSW be the slackness parameter corresponding to the
PNE and social welfare, respectively. Recall that dfidx > 0
(Corollary 1), for x ∈ {xPNE , xSW }. Hence, using strict
concavity of fi, we have xPNE , xSW ∈ (0, x). Therefore,
µST − x <
∑N
i=1 ai{λRi }PNE < µST , and µST − x <∑N
i=1 ai{λRi }SW < µST . Hence, ηTRI and ηLI are upper
bounded by:
ηTRI =
(λRT )SW
(λRT )PNE
<
µSTaN
(µST − x)a1
, and
ηLI =
(
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i )PNE
(
∑N
i=1 aiλ
R
i )SW
<
µST
µST − x
.

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